Legal Eye & Acumen.

While dealing with a contempt petition, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has accepted an apology of a Notary for notarising a marriage document and also welcomed the suggestion provided by a Senior Advocate and member of the Bar Council of India (BCI) that a letter would be circulated by the BCI to all Notaries reproducing the office memorandum by which Notaries have been restrained from executing marriage/divorce deeds.

The High Court was considering a petition registered by the High Court in a suo moto exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Bench of Justice G. S. Ahluwalia and Justice Anuradha Shukla held, “Accordingly, by accepting his apology, it is directed that before resuming the work of notary, Shri Samadhiya shall affix a board displaying that notarization of any document pertaining to performance of marriage will not be done.”

“It is submitted by Shri Jitendra Sharma, who is also a member of Bar Council of India, that a letter will also be circulated to all Notaries reproducing the office memorandum issued by Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs (Notary Cell) on 10.10.2024, by which Notaries have been restrained from executing marriage/divorce deeds so that every Notary can be informed about the limitations on their jurisdiction and every Notary will be requested that they should not execute any document in utter violation of office memorandum issued by Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs (Notary Cell). The gesture shown by Bar Council of India is in consonance with law and for the protection of innocent aspirants who go to the Court under the hope and belief that they will get the court marriage performed”, it stated.

Factual Background
A writ petition was filed in the nature of habeas corpus alleging that the wife of the petitioner was in illegal detention of the third Respondent, who was the father of the corpus. The corpus appeared before the Court and made a statement that they went to the District Court, Datia, for court marriage and there one Advocate obtained their signatures on certain papers and informed them that their marriage had been performed. The case diary was produced, and it was found that one document notarised by the Notary Public was present in the case diary. The High Court, after taking note of the office memorandum issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs (Notary Cell), as well as various cases, held that a Notary has no jurisdiction to execute any document to give a false impression in the mind of aspirants that a court marriage has been performed, and the Notary cannot act as Marriage Officer.

A notice was issued to the Notary, who accepted his mistake and stated that by mistake, a document pertaining to the marriage of the corpus was executed. It was also stated that he was aware of the office memorandum issued by the Central Government and he had no authority to act as Marriage Officer. The Notary prayed that he be pardoned for the illegal act which he had committed and also gave an undertaking that he would never repeat such a mistake in future.

Reasoning
The Bench, at the outset, stated, “Committing a mistake is not a sin, but repeating the same will be a sin. There should not be any hatred towards a sinner, but hatred should be for the sin. Shri Samadhiya has accepted his mistake not only today but on 28.07.2026 also. Whether that acceptance is from the bottom of his heart or it is superficial cannot be adjudicated in these proceedings because that can be ascertained from his future conduct.”

Considering that the Notary had also agreed to affix a display board at the place of his working that notarization of any marriage document is forbidden in law and had also agreed to contribute Rs 2 lakh for the welfare of the Bar, the Bench held that another opportunity could be given to him.

Thus, accepting his apology, the Bench mentioned, “Shri Samadhiya also undertakes to deposit the cost of Rs. 2,00,000/- in the Registry of this Court before resumption of his notary work, i.e., latest by Monday (17.08.2026). The cost deposited by Shri Raghvendra Samadhiya will be utilized by the High Court Bar Association, Gwalior for the betterment of services in the Bar Association.”

The Bench also clarified that any effort to notarise any document prior to deposit of cost would be treated as utter defiance of the order and he would be permanently restrained from performing the duty of the Notary. The Bench ordered dropping of proceedings initiated against Notary Samadhiya.

Senior Advocate Jitendra Sharma, who is also a member of the Bar Council of India, brought it to the Court’s notice that every Notary would be informed about the limitations on their jurisdiction. Accepting such a suggestion, the Bench disposed of the Petition.

The Supreme Court on Monday (17.08.2026) issued directions to curb the use of black money in elections, holding that unaccounted cash used to influence voters strikes at the root of free and fair elections and compromises the “very essence of democracy.”

A bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh issued the directions while hearing an appeal arising out of a 2015 Karnataka High Court order that had quashed an FIR against the respondent. The respondent, Prathik Parasrampuria, was a candidate in the 2014 Lok Sabha bye-election from Bellary, and was alleged to have hoarded a large amount of cash for bribing the voters. The High Court quashed the FIR on the ground that the complaint did not specify whom the accused intended to bribe or the mode he had planned to adopt.

While hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the proceedings to examine the larger systematic issue of black money in elections, and issued notice to the Election Commission of India, the Union government, and all States and Union Territories. Senior Advocate Gaurav Aggarwal and Advocate (Dr.) Swapnil Tripathi were appointed as amici curiae.

“If it is that this one chance at expression is itself tainted, it would not be an understatement to say that the very essence of democracy, which is a rule of the people, by the people and for the people, is compromised,” the Court observed. It further stated that a choice “influenced by external factors is no longer a choice of their own. It is somebody else's choice being thrust upon them.”

The bench traced the evolution of democracy from ancient Athens to the present representative form and stated that democracy, the rule of law, and the electoral process are three ideas “inextricably linked to one another,” such that if one is compromised, it impacts the three ideas in entirety.



The judgment authored by Justice Sanjay Karol relied upon the concurring opinion of Justice HR Khanna in Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, that democracy “can indeed function only upon the faith that elections are free and fair and not rigged and manipulated.” The Constitution Bench judgment in Anoop Baranwal v Union of India was also referred to, where the Court had observed that “the ballot is more potent than the most powerful gun.”

While discussing the constitutional mandate of the Election Commission of India under Article 324 of the Constitution of India, the bench reiterated the settled principles governing the Commission's powers, and observed that while its jurisdiction is “wide enough to include all powers necessary for smooth conduct of elections.”

The Court traced the developments from Justice PN Bhagwati's observation in 1975 in Kanwar Lal Gupta v Amar Nath Chawla, that unchecked financial disparity between candidates produces “anti-democratic effects,”, to the 1990 Goswami Committee Report, the 1993 Vohra Committee Report on the nexus between crime syndicates and politics, and the 255th Law Commission Report (2015), which had noted that “currency notes come first in containers, then in truckloads, moving to wholesale/small retail forms, and finally to suitcases and in people's pockets.”

The bench also took a note of data placed before it by the Election Commission of India showing that while 3,87,430 FIRs were registered during the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, only about 42.9% (1,66,044) had resulted in convictions, while the rest pending trial or investigation.

Further, the Court flagged the Commission's concern regarding the unilateral withdrawal of election-related prosecutions by the government after the change in the ruling dispensation. For this, reference was made to the Commission's communication to Chief Secretaries stating that such withdrawal “sends a wrong signal that miscreants may indulge in any electoral malpractices and offences at elections with impunity as those cases may be withdrawn later.”

Amicus (Dr.) Swapnil Tripathi submitted a note on 'Global Practices in Election Matter' before the Court, comparing the position across sixteen jurisdictions including Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, and Indonesia. It flagged that in most jurisdictions, the decisions to prosecute or withdraw election-offence cases vest solely with public prosecutors without any role for the election management body.

Directions issued

Considering the suggestions made by the amici and the Election Commission, the Supreme Court issued the following directions:

Any authority effecting a seizure of cash/assets must report it to the jurisdictional District Magistrate or Additional District Magistrate or Court within 24 hours, along with written reasons showing a prima facie nexus with a suspected electoral offence.

Investigating Officers must make every effort to complete the investigation within one year of the registration of FIR. Any delay must be recorded in writing and reported to the Election Commission of India.

Quarterly status reports on investigation must be submitted to the Election Commission through a Nodal Officer, after the approval of the concerned Senior Superintendent or Deputy Commissioner of Police.

When cash exceeding Rs. 10 Lakhs is detected by the Static Surveillance Teams, the same must be reported to the Income Tax authorities.

High Courts to designate special courts for prompt disposal of cases registered against candidates and sitting Members of Parliament or Members of Legislative Assemblies, given the recurring five-year election cycle.

Approval of jurisdictional High Court mandatory for withdrawal of prosecution against candidates in an election cycle, as per State of Kerala v K Ajith and Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v Union of India.

Noting the large percentage of pendency of cases in connection with 2024 Lok Sabha and 2019-25 Assembly elections, the Court directed concerned courts to make all efforts to bring cases to their logical conclusion with utmost expedition.

The Supreme Court had directed the Election Commission of India and the respective governments to file a compliance report on or before November 18, 2026.

The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has refused to quash criminal proceedings against three Directors of a pharmaceutical company over the manufacture of a drug declared “Not of Standard Quality”, holding that a Director cannot escape prosecution at the threshold merely by claiming that he had no personal role in the manufacturing process.

The Court held that whether a Director was “in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business” under Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is a factual issue that ordinarily requires examination of evidence at trial.

The Court observed that whether a Director was actually “in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business” within the meaning of Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is essentially a question of fact requiring appreciation of evidence and, therefore, cannot ordinarily be conclusively adjudicated at the threshold in proceedings for quashing.

A bench of Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal thus dismissed the petition filed by three Directors of Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd., who had sought quashing of the complaint and the order whereby the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu had taken cognizance of offences under Section 18(a)(i) read with Section 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and issued process against them.

Background of the case:

The petitioners, Directors of Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd., challenged proceedings arising from a Government Analyst's report dated August 31, 2016 declaring a drug manufactured by the Company as “Not of Standard Quality.” Following the report, the Company was issued a statutory notice, in response to which it stated that the sale had been stopped, no stock remained, and requested the authorities to take a lenient view.

A subsequent joint inspection found the manufacturing process compliant with GMP norms and the requisite quantity of bulk drug used, but nevertheless recommended action under the applicable guidelines. The Drug Inspector thereafter filed a complaint under Sections 18(a)(i) read with 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, pursuant to which the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu took cognizance and issued process. The Directors then approached the High Court under Section 561-A CrPC seeking quashing of the complaint and proceedings.

After considering the rival submissions, Justice Nargal formulated a few questions for determination, observing that they were closely interlinked.

The first question was whether the petitioners' plea that they were not responsible for the conduct of the Company and were not involved in manufacturing the drug could be accepted at the threshold, or whether the issue was required to be determined by the Trial Court under Section 34 of the Act.

The Court answered the question against the petitioners. It examined Section 34, which provides for liability of persons who, at the time of commission of an offence by a Company, were “in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business”. The provision also permits such person to establish that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised due diligence to prevent its commission.

Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Dinesh B. Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 11 SCC 125, the Court noted that a technical approach should not be adopted in proceedings concerning Directors prosecuted under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The Supreme Court had left it open to the Directors to establish before the Trial Court that they had nothing to do with the manufacturing process.

Justice Nargal accordingly observed,

“The petitioners cannot, at this stage, avoid the operation of Section 34 of the Act merely by disputing their responsibility for the conduct of the Company's business or by asserting that they had no role in the actual manufacturing process.”

Importantly, the Court clarified that actual physical participation in manufacture is not the sole test under Section 34. Merely because manufacturing activity was carried out under the supervision of qualified technical personnel, the Directors could not automatically disassociate themselves from the Company's affairs and responsibilities. The extent of their responsibility, the nature of their control and whether they satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 34 were matters requiring appreciation of evidence, it underscored.

Thus, while directorship alone does not conclusively establish guilt, non-involvement equally cannot ordinarily be conclusively determined at the quashing stage, he maintained.

The second question concerned the Company's earlier response to the statutory notice. The Court noted that the Company had not disputed the findings communicated by the Department. Instead, it had stopped sale of the batch, confirmed that no stock remained and requested a lenient view after stating that it admired the findings and honored the judgment.

The Court held that such conduct was relevant while examining the subsequent challenge and invoked the doctrine of approbation and reprobation.

The third question required the Court to consider whether, having regard to the public-health object of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, proceedings involving a drug declared “Not of Standard Quality” could be quashed by adopting a technical approach at the threshold.

The Court answered this question against the petitioners, emphasising that the Act is not merely regulatory legislation. Its purpose is to ensure that drugs made available to the public conform to prescribed standards of quality, safety and efficacy and to prevent manufacture and distribution of sub-standard, adulterated or unsafe drugs.

Justice Nargal further observed that this legislative purpose has a direct nexus with Article 21 of the Constitution, since the right to life encompasses health and well-being. Consumers of medicines are entitled to expect that drugs made available for human consumption meet prescribed standards.

“…The manufacture and distribution of drugs which fail to meet the prescribed standards, therefore, carries a direct bearing upon public health and, consequently, implicates the constitutional concern underlying Article 21. The statutory safeguards contained in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act must accordingly be understood as serving not merely a regulatory purpose, but also as an important legislative mechanism for protecting the health and life” the court remarked.

The Court therefore declined to adopt a hyper-technical approach and held,

“This Court does not find that the proceedings against the petitioners can be quashed by adopting a hyper-technical approach at the threshold.”

Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate any ground warranting interference with the complaint or the Magistrate's order. The interim order staying the proceedings before the Trial Court was also vacated.

The Allahabad High Court has held that excess salary paid to a Class-III employee because of the employer's own faulty pay fixation cannot be recovered from his post-retiral dues where the mistake is corrected 17 years later and the employee is not shown to have brought it about.

Directing refund of Rs. 11,51,840/- deducted from the retiral dues of a retired Head Constable (Driver), with 7% simple interest, Justice Manish Kumar Nigam held,

“In the present case, it has not been denied by the respondents that the petitioner was not responsible in any manner for alleged wrongful pay fixation. In the present case, according to the respondents, the wrong fixation of the salary of the petitioner was done in the year 2008, which has been sought to be corrected in the year 2025, after lapse of 17 years.”
The petitioner was appointed a Constable in the PAC in 1984 and was later promoted Head Constable (Driver), a Class-III post. He retired on 31st July 2025. In October 2024, respondent No. 4 sought his explanation on revision of his pay scale. He replied that he had never applied for any increase and was shortly to retire.

Rejecting that explanation, respondent No. 4 by order dated 15th February 2025 refixed his salary, bringing him down from the pay scale of Rs. 64,100/- to Rs. 56,900/- with effect from 1st July 2023, and treated Rs. 11,51,840/- as paid in excess. The petitioner challenged the retrospective refixation as arbitrary and the deduction from his retiral dues as impermissible.

The respondents said the second promotional pay scale given from 10th November 2008 and the third ACP from 10th November 2010 had been wrongly granted in the face of a punishment order dated 20th November 2006, and the impugned order only corrected the position. They added that he had given a written undertaking to refund any excess, and had not seriously challenged the refixation.

Relying on State of Punjab and others Vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), the Court noted that recovery was barred from Class-III and Class-IV employees, from those who have retired or are to retire within a year of the recovery order, and of payments spread over more than five years.

In Head Constable Prahlad Singh v. State of U.P., the Allahabad High Court had held that an undertaking given at retirement covers only wrongful computation of pension and other retiral dues, and is no consent to re-fixation from a back date.

The Court held that “the recovery of excess amount paid to the petitioner for wrong fixation of salary cannot be sustained”.
The petition was allowed in part, with a mandamus to refund the amount with 7% simple interest from the date of deduction till actual payment, within six weeks.

The Gujarat High Court has launched a state-of-the-art Enterprise Wi-Fi facility across its court complex to enhance digital access for advocates and litigants during court proceedings.

The facility was inaugurated on August 15 by Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal.

According to a press note issued by the High Court, the Wi-Fi system is powered by approximately 655 enterprise-grade Access Points and has been built on a high-density, centralised enterprise framework to provide secure internet access across the complex.

The network has been optimised to provide seamless, high-speed Wi-Fi 6 connectivity in key user areas, including courtrooms, lobbies, the Advocate Bar Room, Lady Advocates' Bar Room (Library), Advocate Canteen, Advocate Libraries and the AIR Cafe.

The High Court stated that the facility is aimed at digitally empowering advocates and litigants during court proceedings and supporting the digital functioning of courts. It has been envisaged as a foundational pillar under the e-Courts project and the paperless court vision.

The initiative, the press note said, is a major step towards building an accessible, efficient and technologically integrated judicial ecosystem.

The Supreme Court has reiterated that a legal representative of a person killed in a motor accident can maintain a claim for compensation even if the particular legal representative was not financially dependent on the deceased.

The Court, relying on its earlier decisions, emphasised that “liability to pay compensation under the Act does not cease because of absence of dependency of the legal representative concerned.”

“Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person because of a motor vehicle accident has a remedy for realisation of compensation to be paid under different heads.”, observed the bench of Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh and Justice NV Anjaria. The Court stated that legal representatives who are not dependants are entitled to claim compensation under heads such as loss of consortium.

The bench was dealing with a claim arising from the death of Shaik Janimiya, who died after being hit by a car while walking in Malkajgiri, Hyderabad, in June 2012. His wife and three children were the claimants.

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had awarded compensation of ₹8.44 lakh. The High Court subsequently enhanced it to ₹11,00,672, including ₹10,23,672 towards loss of dependency.

Before the Supreme Court, the claimants sought further enhancement, particularly on the ground that the three children of the deceased were also entitled to compensation for loss of parental consortium.

Allowing the appeal, the judgment authored by Justice Anjaria held that actual financial dependency is not a prerequisite for claiming consortium.

The Court referred to Manjuri Bera vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Another (2007) 10 SCC 643, where it was “expounded that liability to pay compensation under the Act does not cease because of absence of dependency of the legal representative concerned…”. It was also held in the said judgment that "devolution of the deceased's estate, rather than actual financial dependency, was the relevant consideration for determining whether the claim was maintainable."

The judgment also relied on National Insurance Company Limited v. Birender, which dealt with claims by major, married and earning sons of a deceased person. The Court in that case held that such persons could still qualify as legal representatives under Section 166(1)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, although the quantum of compensation could depend on the extent of their dependency

The Bench also referred to its earlier ruling in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, which held that a legal representative ordinarily means a person who legally represents the estate of the deceased or upon whom the estate devolves.

Importantly, the Court observed that every legal representative who suffers on account of a death caused by a motor accident has a remedy for recovery of compensation under the different heads recognised in law.

"In other words, when all such persons covered within the expression “legal representative” are entitled to maintain the compensation petition and seek compensation for loss of life of the victim of a motor accident, by virtue of that very principle and in view of the concept of consortium, it is one of the heads of compensation which becomes payable in motor accident claim cases."

Children entitled to parental consortium

The Court's ruling also addressed the separate head of consortium, holding that it is an important component of just compensation.

The Bench explained that consortium is not confined to the surviving spouse. It includes spousal, parental and filial consortium. Parental consortium compensates a child for the loss of parental aid, protection, affection, guidance, society and training following the premature death of a parent.

In the present case, the deceased's wife was entitled to spousal consortium, while his three children, aged between 18 and 21, were entitled to parental consortium. The Court found that the Claims Tribunal had committed a “manifest error” by awarding only Rs 5,000 to the wife and nothing to the children under this head

Applying the law, the Court observed:

“In the present case, appellant No. 1 is the wife whereas appellant Nos. 2 to 4 are the sons and the daughter of the deceased. All the children are aged between 18 and 21 years. They would be legitimately and legally entitled to amount of compensation under the head of consortium, spousal as well as parental. It was never in dispute that appellant Nos. 2 to 4 were dependants of the deceased. Appellant Nos. 2 to 4, therefore, ought to have been considered as legal representatives and dependants of the deceased to be entitled to parental consortium.”

The Court relied upon Pranay Sethi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2017) 16 SCC 680, which fixed ₹40,000 as the amount for loss of consortium and directed that the conventional amounts be enhanced by 10% every three years.

Applying the enhancement, the Court determined the consortium amount at ₹48,400 for each claimant.

Accordingly, the wife was awarded ₹48,400 towards spousal consortium, while each of the two sons and the daughter was awarded ₹48,400 towards parental consortium.

“The High Court awarded total Rs. 11,00,672/- under different heads. As per the above calculation, the total amount of compensation now arrived at, by adding the consortium figures would come to Rs. 12,47,272/-. The additional amount of Rs. 1,46,600/- shall be payable with 7.5% interest from the date of filing of the petition till realisation. The Insurance Company is directed to deposit with the Tribunal concerned, the above additional amount with interest as provided, within six weeks.”, the Court held.

The appeal was allowed in the aforesaid terms.

Registration of Births & Deaths (Amendment) Act, 2026: New Rules for Delayed Registration After One Year and Two Years.
After 1 year but within 2 years: registration requires an order of the District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or an Executive Magistrate authorised by the District Magistrate, after verification and payment of the prescribed fee.
After 2 years: registration requires an order of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class, after verification and payment of the prescribed fee.